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Abstract
Quantum logic understood as a reconstruction program had real suc-
cesses and genuine limitations. This paper offers a synopsis of both and
suggests a way of seeing quantum logic in a larger, still thriving context.
keywords: quantum logic, quantum mechanics, lattice theory, orthomodular
lattices, POVMs
1 Introduction
The term “quantum logic” covers many philosophical views and more than one
set of mathematical tools. However, lattices have been especially important in the
history of quantum logic, and will be the focus of what follows. This paper doesn’t
aim to present new results, but rather to do a bit of summing up and looking for-
ward. We begin with a brief review of the reconstruction of quantum mechanics—
or Hilbert space, at least—within lattice theory. That will lead to a handful of
small results with some foundational significance that can be demonstrated using
elementary lattice theory. Then follows some discussion of limitations of lattices, a
discussion of entwinement and some associated puzzles, and finally some thoughts
on broader approaches that are still within the spirit of quantum logic.
2 Lattices and Representation Theorems
A lattice is a partially-ordered set L = {L,≤} with greatest lower bound and least
upper bound operations ∧ and ∨. If there are minimum non-zero elements, the
lattice is atomic and those elements are atoms. L is complemented if there are
least and greatest elements 0, and 1 and if for any a, there is at least one b such
that a ∧ b = 0 and a ∨ b = 1. If there is a map a 7→ a⊥ such that a and a⊥ are
complements, a = a⊥⊥, and a ≤ b⇒ b⊥ ≤ a⊥ then L is orthocomplemented. An
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orthocomplemented lattice is orthomodular if a ≤ b implies b = a ∨ (b ∧ a⊥). We
say that a commutes with b (write aCb) if a = (a∧ b)∨ (a∧ b⊥). It can be shown
that an orthocomplemented lattice is orthomodular if the relation C is symmetric.
Suppose L is an atomic orthomodular lattice. Suppose that in addition, L is
complete (operations everywhere defined), irreducible (only 0 and 1 commute with
every lattice element) and satisfies the covering law (if p is an atom and p 6≤ q,
then there is no element strictly between q and p ∨ q). We’ll call such lattices
Piron Lattices. Piron’s 1964 result [1] provides a representation theorem for such
structures:
Piron’s Theorem: If L is a Piron lattice of dimension ≥ 4, then there
is an involutive division ring D and a vector space V with a Hermitian
form (generalized inner product) 〈·, ·〉 over V such that L is isomor-
phic to the lattice L(V ) of closed subspaces of V .
If the goal of a reconstruction theorem is to get us all the way to Hilbert space,
then Piron’s theorem falls short. One obvious limitation: the theorem only holds
in four or more dimensions. More importantly, in 1980 H. A. Keller showed that
there are infinite-dimensional vector spaces with Hermitian forms over division
rings other than R, C and H. [2] In 1995, Maria Sole`r identified the condition
that picks out Hilbert space. Define orthogonality as usual: vectors x and y are
orthogonal if 〈x, y〉 = 0. For any set of vectors M , let M⊥ be the set of all vectors
orthogonal to every element of M . V is orthomodular1 if S = S⊥⊥ for every
closed subspace S. If V also contains an infinite orthonormal sequence, then V is
a Hilbert space. [3]. (Holland gives a clear exposition; see [4].)
Sole`r’s condition has a lattice-theoretic counterpart. Suppose that L(V ) con-
tains a sequence {a1, a2 . . .} of orthogonal atoms such that for any pair ai, ai+1
there is an atom c ≤ ai ∨ ai+ whose harmonic conjugate c′ relative to ai, ai+1
is orthogonal to c. Then V is a Hilbert space. (For discussion and definitions,
see Pitowksky [5] or Holland [4].) This condition entails that c bisects the angle
between the orthogonal atoms ai and ai+1. (See [5, p.12].)
3 Some Small Results
Quantum logic has obvious limitations as a reconstruction tool; more on that later.
In this section, we look at a handful of small but hopefully interesting results that
can be verified using only elementary lattice calculations.
1Note that the term as used here is not the usual lattice-theoretic term.
2
3.1 Entanglement
Schro¨dinger famously claimed that entanglement is the characteristic feature of
quantum systems. [6, p. 555]. There’s room to quibble about that, but any pur-
ported reconstruction of quantum mechanics has to address the question of how to
represent compound systems. Whether or not a tensor product exists for every pair
of Piron lattices, we can offer reasonable conditions on what such a product should
be like when it does exist. The general idea is that the product should be a lattice
of the same type, generated by independent isomorphic images of the subsystem
lattices. I proposed the following conditions in [7]. Suppose that LA and LB are
both Piron lattices.
Product of Piron Lattices:
1. LA ⊗ LB is a Piron lattice with least element 0 and greatest element 1
2. iA and iB map LA and LA isomorphically and independently2 into LA⊗LB,
with iA(0) = 0, iA(1) = 1, and similarly for iB .
3. If BA and BB are maximal Boolean sublattices of LA and LB, then iA(BA)∪
iB(BB) generates a Boolean product ofBA and BB that is a maximal Boolean
sublattice of LA ⊗ LB
4. iA(LA) ∪ iB(LB) generates LA ⊗ LB .
This definition generalize the requirements on product probability spaces. For the
usual quantum cases, the product exists, though it is not unique. In particular, if
V1 and V2 are Hilbert spaces, then L(V1 ⊗ V2) is a lattice product of L(V1) and
(V2). The product conditions allow us to prove the existence of “entangled” atoms:
atoms of LA ⊗ LB that can’t be reduced to the form iA(α) ∧ iB(β), where α and
β are atoms of LA and LB respectively. For a detailed proof, see my [7]. Present
purposes will be satisfied with a sketch.
In what follows, we abuse notation and write α∧ β rather than iA(α) ∧ iB(β),
letting order keep track. Since our product generalizes the classical Boolean case,
not every example will contain entangled elements. However, we can show that
in the usual quantum case, entangled atoms must exist in any product. Let LA
and LB be qubit lattices—lattices of subspaces of two-dimensional Hilbert space.
(Note that all such lattices are isomorphic, regardless of whether the vector spaces
are over R, C or H.) Suppose {a, a⊥} and {b, b⊥} are pairs of orthogonal atoms
in LA and LB respectively. Then a bit of lattice calculation shows that a ∧ b and
a⊥ ∧ b⊥ are strongly perspective. That is, a ∧ b and a⊥ ∧ b⊥ have a common
complement in LA ⊗ LB (hence they are perspective) and they have a common
complement in their own span—within the sublattice whose zero is 0 and whose
2i.e., if α is any non-zero element of LA and β is any non-zero element of LA, then iA(α) ∧ iB(β)
is a non-zero element of LA ⊗ LB
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unit is (a ∧ b) ∨ (a⊥ ∧ b⊥). Since a ∧ b and a⊥ ∧ b⊥ are atoms, this means that
there is an atom p ≤ (a ∧ b) ∨ (a⊥ ∧ b⊥) distinct from both a ∧ b and a⊥ ∧ b⊥—a
“superposition,” if you will, of a ∧ b and a⊥ ∧ b⊥. Moreover, straightforward but
tedious lattice calculation shows that this atom can’t be identical with any atom of
the form iA(α) ∧ iB(β). The argument can be generalized to higher dimensions.
As we’ll see, this has further consequences.
3.2 No Cloning
Though hardly a complicated result, I’m not aware of this having been pointed out
anywhere else. We can prove a lattice-theoretic version of the no-cloning result.
Understood in lattice terms, a cloning machine would begin with a pair of isomor-
phic orthomodular lattices LA and LB . If the initial state of the pair is represented
by an atom φA ∧ αB , the the cloning procedure would induce a change of state in
accord with an automorphism ι on the lattice LA⊗LB. The action of ι would be to
map φA ∧ βB to φA ∧ φB , where the automorphism doesn’t depend on the choice
of atom φto be cloned. (Here we assume that an isomorphism between LA and LB
has been singled out, and that φB is the image of φA under this isomorphism.)
Suppose LA and LB are qubit lattices. Suppose that the state of the system to
be cloned is represented by one of the atoms a1, a⊥1 , a2, a⊥2 , and the target system
is in the “ready state” given by the atom β. In that case, ι will have to satisfy
1. a1 ∧ β 7→ι a1 ∧ a1
2. a⊥1 ∧ β 7→ι a⊥1 ∧ a⊥1
Now suppose the state to be cloned is not a1 or a⊥1 , but a2, which is an axis of
perspectivity (“superposition”) of a1 and a⊥1 . Then ι(a2 ∧ β) must be an axis of
perspectivity of ι(a1∧β) and ι(a⊥1 ∧β). But that amounts to saying that a2∧a2 must
be an axis of perspectivity for a1 ∧ a1 and a⊥1 ∧ a⊥1 , and this is impossible. This is
a special case of the point from 3.1. The proof of the existence of entangled atoms
amounts to showing that an axis of perspectivity for a1∧a1 and a⊥1 ∧a⊥1 can’t have
the form ξ ∧ ψ. If cloning is understood as a dynamical process represented by an
automorphism on the lattice, then lattice-theoretic considerations rule out a general
cloning procedure. Obviously this also shows that the measurement problem arises
at a purely lattice-theoretic level.
3.3 Why the Quantum? Lattices and PR Boxes
Quantum mechanics permits correlations that classical theories don’t allow, but
there are limits to their strength. Rather than saturating the CHSH inequality,
quantum correlations can be no stronger than the Tsirelson bound allows. [8]
On the other hand, there are logically possible systems that don’t allow signaling
4
but saturate CHSH. The most well-known examples are so-called “PR boxes”—
hypothetical non-local systems introduced into the literature by Popescu and Rohrlich.
[9]. The question “Why the quantum?” is often a way of asking for a principle that
allows quantum correlations but rules out the ones that violate Tsirelson’s bound.
It would be a serious exaggeration to say that quantum logic has an answer to
this question, but it does have something to say. (See [10] for further discussion.)
Once again, consider a pair of qubit lattices. We can ask: what limitations do the
lattice conditions for LA⊗LB impose on correlations? Let’s look at the particular
case of PR box correlations and ask what would happen if we tried to model them
by starting with two qubit lattices, reasoning about their product. Consider two
systems, A andB, with two binary observables on each. Let {a1, a⊥1 } and {a2, a⊥2 }
represent the outcome pairs for A, and {b1, b⊥1 } and {b2, b⊥2 } play the same role
for B. Intuitively, the PR box correlations are
1. a1 ↔ b1
2. a1 ↔ b2
3. a2 ↔ b1
4. a2 ↔ b⊥2
In the form of lattice polynomials, they become
1. (a1 ∧ b1) ∨ (a⊥1 ∧ b⊥1 )
2. (a1 ∧ b2) ∨ (a⊥1 ∧ b⊥2 )
3. (a2 ∧ b1) ∨ (a⊥2 ∧ b⊥1 )
4. (a2 ∧ b⊥2 ) ∨ (a⊥2 ∧ b2)
If 1—4 belonged to a common Boolean algebra, there would be no consistent way
to assign the value 1 to each; the Boolean conjunction of the four is 0, though
any three are classically consistent. As a matter of pure lattice theory, it’s also
possible to represent any three of the four correlations; a Boolean algebra, after
all, is a special case of a lattice. However, if the two possible A-inputs and the
two possible B-inputs are each “non-commuting,” we are wrenched away from
Booleanity; a2 and a⊥2 are axes of perspectivity for a1 and a⊥2 and b2 and b⊥2 are
axes of perspectivity for b1 and b⊥2 .
Reasoning from this stricture, the problem is easy to locate. It’s not just that we
can’t represent all four correlations at once; it’s that we can’t even represent any
pair. To illustrate, consider correlations 1 and 2. For the product lattice to embody
both of these correlations, there would have to be an atom Φ in LA⊗LB such that
Φ ≤ (a1 ∧ b1) ∨ (a
⊥
1 ∧ b
⊥
1 ) and Φ ≤ (a1 ∧ b2) ∨ (a⊥1 ∧ b⊥2 ). Because all elements
of 1 commute, as do all elements of 2, we can re-write these two correlations as
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1. (a1 ∨ b⊥1 ) ∧ (a⊥1 ∨ b1)
2. (a1 ∨ b⊥2 ) ∧ (a⊥1 ∨ b2)
For Φ to be under each of 1 and 2, it must be under each of (a1 ∨ b⊥1 ), (a⊥1 ∨ b1),
(a1∨b
⊥
2 ), and (a⊥1 ∨b2). Hence, Φ must be under the meet of any pair of these. But
consider (a1∨b⊥1 ) and (a1∨b⊥2 ). a1 commutes with each of b⊥1 and b⊥2 . Therefore,
a1, b
⊥
1 and b⊥2 form a distributive triple—all Boolean distribution rules apply. [11,
p. 466]. We have
Φ ≤ (a1 ∨ b
⊥
1 ) ∧ (a1 ∨ b
⊥
2 ) = a1 ∨ (b
⊥
1 ∧ b
⊥
2 )
Since b⊥1 and b⊥2 are atoms in LB, their meet is 0. And so we have
Φ ≤ a1.
But by an exactly similar argument using (a⊥1 ∨ b1) and (a⊥1 ∨ b2), we have
Φ ≤ a⊥1 .
This would force Φ to be 0. However, Φ was introduced as an atom in the sup-
port of both correlations; Φ cannot be 0. Thus, whatever the relationship between
alternate choices of input may be for a PR box, it’s of a different sort than the
relationship between complementary quantum observables.
4 Limitations
A set of purely lattice-theoretic conditions picks out Hilbert space in the infinite-
dimensional case. The proofs call for deep and difficult mathematics. The coordi-
natization theorems aren’t adequate to pick out qubits (because the qubit lattice is
only two-dimensional), and even with Sole`r’s result, we don’t, so far as I know,
have an adequate characterization theorem for finite dimensions. Furthermore,
even in the infinite dimensional case, Sole`r’s condition does not uniquely pick out
the complex numbers. One might well be sympathetic to what Halvorson and Bub
suggest: that quantum logic is a “failed attempt” at deriving quantum mechanics,
and that to whatever extent it succeeds, it does so “at the expense of complicating
the axioms to the point of destroying all physical insight.” [12, p. 1]
Arguably, things aren’t quite this dire. First a small point: the fact that Sole`r’s
condition doesn’t pick out C by itself isn’t a problem. We can ask worthwhile ques-
tions about real and quaternionic quantum mechanics and so a general characteri-
zation theorem shouldn’t single out C. This is perfectly compatible with looking
for additional conditions that rule out R and H. More important, on what seems
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to me to be the most helpful understanding, the key idea of quantum logic is that
the non-Boolean structure of events lies at the heart of the peculiarities of quantum
mechanics. From that perspective, quantum logic is the study of the consequences
of that structure—especially but not exclusively its consequences for probability.
In this context, Itamar Pitowsky deserves special mention. It would be hard to
read his work and come away with the impression that we get no physical insight
from quantum logic. For example: Pitowsky pointed out that we can understand
quantum uncertainty as a combinatorial, logical relationship (see, for example, [13,
section 2.1]). He also showed that Gleason’s theorem [14] itself can be understood
combinatorially. (For a sketch of the idea, see [5, section 3.3].) These are both
non-trivial observations; the second is quite deep.
But what of the assumptions needed to establish Piron’s and Sole`r’s theorems?
Are they simply obscure? Most physicists don’t speak the language of lattice the-
ory, but nothing turns on that. Orthomodularity is a weakened form of the dis-
tributive law, which figures in innumerable standard probability calculations. If the
lattice were fully distributive, it would be Boolean, and the point of quantum logic
is that the events to which we assign probabilities don’t have a Boolean structure.
Further, orthomodularity is part of what ensures that Piron lattices are composed
of Boolean sublattices “pasted together,” and this reflects another characteristic of
quantum systems. Non-commutativity of elements in an orthomodular lattice is
the logical/lattice-theoretic counterpart of the non-commutativity of projectors in
Hilbert space. The irreducibility condition is the lattice version of the fact that, set-
ting superselection rules aside, the only projectors that commute with all projectors
are I and 0. Quantum logic doesn’t “explain” noncommutativity; noncommutativ-
ity is inseparable from quantum theory. Every reconstruction builds it in one way
or another. Quantum logic is distinctive in seeing noncommutativity as a feature of
the logical structure of events themselves.
Atomicity can’t be justified a priori, but it’s hardly insight-destroying to add it
to the list of conditions. There is a possible world with no least (i.e., maximally
informative) non-zero experimental propositions; as far as we know, ours is not
that world.
The meaning of the covering law is less obvious, but as Jauch and Piron pointed
out many years ago, it’s equivalent to a plausible constraint on ideal measurement—
that ideal measurements should preserve as much information as possible, consis-
tent with the event structure. ([15]. See also Wilce’s discussion of quantum logic
in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [16].)
What of Sole`r’s condition? Pitowsky hoped it could be understood as a prob-
ability interpolation requirement: if a and b are orthogonal atoms with p(a) = 1
and hence p(b) = 0, then there is a third atom c ≤ a∨ b whose probability must be
1/2. However, as Pitowsky makes clear [5, section 3.4], there are delicate issues
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here, including unsolved mathematical problems about finite dimensional cases.
5 Entwinement and a Puzzle About POVMs
Schro¨dinger’s comment notwithstanding, there’s another feature of quantum theory
that has at least as much right as entanglement to be considered the source of its
mysteries, and it plays a central role in quantum logic. The word I would like
to persuade people to use is entwinement. In the prologue to proving his theorem,
Gleason points out a difference between the frames (essentially, orthonormal bases)
that we find in two dimensions and frames in all higher-dimensional cases. First we
recall the term “frame function.” A frame function is an additive function f on the
frames of a Hilbert space such that there is a real number r for which Σifαi = r
for every frame {αi}. If f is non-negative and r = 1, f is a probability function.
Gleason writes
In dimension two a frame function can be defined arbitrarily on a
closed quadrant of the unit circle in the real case, and similarly in
the complex case. In higher dimensions the orthonormal sets are in-
tertwined and there is more to be said. ([14, p. 886])
We’ll modify Gleason’s term ever so slightly and say that two frames are en-
twined if some but not all of their elements differ at most by a phase factor. We’ll
apply the same term to complete orthogonal sets of rays, to maximal Boolean sub-
lattices that share some but not all of their atoms, and so on. The quantum-logical
version of entwinement is shared atoms among maximal Boolean sublattices of
L(V ).
I would suggest that when people say that quantum mechanics is contextual,
what they really mean is that exhibits entwinement. The point is that quantum
theory is not contextual. Quantum mechanics represents entwined elements as
being identical across contexts. The “contextuality” is only in the non-quantum
constructions that would be called for to simulate the quantum behavior. Entangle-
ment phenomena are a special case of entwinement. Howard et al. have recently
argued that entwinement (contextuality, in their terms) lies behind the speed-up in
quantum computation. [17]. Their paper builds on work by Cabello et al. linking
graph theory with entwinement. [18]
Gleason’s theorem tells us that the probability structure of quantum theory is
contained in the logical structure. Given the detailed entwinement relations among
subspaces of a Hilbert space with three or more dimensions, the possible proba-
bility measures are completely determined, and in particular, assigning probability
one to a one-dimensional subspace fixes all other probabilities. In two dimensions,
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however, there is no entwinement; probabilities on different frames are indepen-
dent.
This is related to an apparent shortcoming of quantum logic: it provides no ac-
count of generalized measurements, represented by positive operator-valued mea-
sures (POVMs). A POVM is a set {Ei} of positive self-adjoint operators called
effects, such that ΣiEi = I . Surprisingly, there is a Gleason-style theorem for
POVMs on two dimensional Hilbert space, as Busch showed in 2003. [19]. Al-
though a self-adjoint operator on two-dimensional Hilbert space has only two pro-
jectors in its spectral decomposition, POVMs on the same space can contain arbi-
trarily many effects. This extra structure is what makes the proof possible. Caves
et al. [20] prove a collection of related results in which they explicitly use Glea-
son’s “frame function” terminology. In this context, a frame function from effects
into [0, 1] that sums to 1 for the effects in each POVM. Like the frames in Glea-
son’s proof, POVMs are entwined with one another. Here, however, entwinement
holds even for qubits. This means that combinatoric considerations fix the possible
probability assignments for qubits as well as higher-dimensional systems.
A related argument by Cabello [21] provides a Kochen-Specker-style no hid-
den variables proof and it will be worth reviewing that argument briefly. Let A, B
and C be three one-dimensional projectors on two-dimensional Hilbert space, pro-
jecting onto three mutually non-orthogonal vectors. Consider the following three
POVMs:
1. {1
2
A, 1
2
A⊥, 1
2
B, 1
2
B⊥}
2. {1
2
B, 1
2
B⊥, 1
2
C, 1
2
C⊥}
3. {1
2
C, 1
2
C⊥, 1
2
A, 1
2
A⊥}
The effects in each set clearly add to I , and so each set is a POVM. Suppose
that we think of the constituent effects for each POVM as representing mutually
exclusive, jointly exhaustive outcomes and we add the assumption that the POVMs
represent univocal quantities with noncontextual predetermined outcomes. Then
we are immediately led to a contradiction. Suppose, for example, that POVM
1 takes the value associated with 1
2
A. Then so must POVM 3. Furthermore, the
system doesn’t have any of the values associated with theB and C effects. But now
POVM 2 can’t take a value. It’s clear that the same problem will arise no matter
which effect we begin with. This appears to be a serious shortcoming of lattice-
based quantum logic. Restricting our attention to subspaces misses structure that
yields important results.
POVMs have become increasingly important in discussions of quantum foun-
dations. They give rise to structures with some features in common with lattice-
based quantum logic, but with important differences. For a review of formal as-
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pects of POVMs, see [22]. Busch has contributed extensively to the development
of the theory of POVMs. For a recent discussion of how POVMs might be incor-
porated into a realist interpretation of quantum theory, see [23]. To be sure, there’s
more to a qubit than its lattice structure reveals. POVMs are widely seen as more
fundamental than projection-valued measurements. This may be true, but before
we embrace the proposal, it’s worth noting some puzzles. I’ll describe them briefly;
I discuss them in more detail in [24].
From one point of view, Cabello’s argument can be taken as reinforcing an
idea about POVMs that has been around for some time: they represent “unsharp
values.” The example we’ve reviewed can be taken as a reductio of the claim that
POVMs could represent sharp values. To see one problem, however, return to the
three POVMs numbered 1—3 above. It’s true that there’s no way to select exactly
one effect from each POVM. However, compare 1—3 with an analogous case for
three qubits. Associate the A-effect with qubit one, the B-effect with qubit two,
and the C-effects with qubit three. Consider these sets:
4. {1
2
A⊗ I ⊗ I, 1
2
A⊥ ⊗ I ⊗ I, 1
2
I ⊗B ⊗ I, 1
2
I ⊗B⊥ ⊗ I}
5. {1
2
I ⊗B ⊗ I, 1
2
I ⊗B⊥ ⊗ I, 1
2
I ⊗ I ⊗ C, 1
2
I ⊗ I ⊗ C⊥}
6. {1
2
I ⊗ I ⊗ C, 1
2
I ⊗ I ⊗ C⊥, 1
2
A⊗ I ⊗ I, 1
2
A⊥ ⊗ I ⊗ I}
It’s easy to see that each operator is positive and each set adds to I ⊗ I ⊗ I . Thus,
each set is a POVM on the eight-dimensional Hilbert space of the three qubits. But
all six of the operators commute with one another. On the face of it, this would
make it puzzling if the corresponding experimental propositions were intrinsically
unsharp. It’s still true: there’s no way to select exactly one effect from each set.
But what exactly this means is much less clear. In particular, there’s nothing in
the math to serve as a counterpart to the idea that, for example, 1
2
A ⊗ I ⊗ I and
1
2
I ⊗B ⊗ I represent mutually exclusive outcomes.
Even in the single qubit case, where the A, B and C operators are mutually
non-commuting, it’s not clear that 1
2
A, 1
2
B, etc. represent univocal experimental
quantities. This means it’s not clear that the “entwinement” is anything other than
notional. For example, consider these experiments: (i) measure a qubit for z-spin
and then for spin at pi/6 radians to the z-axis in the z − x plane; (ii) measure
a qubit for z-spin and then for spin at −pi/6 radians in the z-x plane. These two
experiments are distinct, and no matter what their outcomes, the qubit will be left in
a different state in experiment (i) than in experiment (ii). However, the POVMs for
the two experiments are identical. Sameness of effect qua positive operator does
not mean sameness of outcome, event, experimental proposition or resulting state.
Experimental outcomes that clearly are not physically equivalent are sometimes
associated with one and the same effect.
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The point is certainly not that Busch or Cabello have made some sort of mathe-
matical mistake, nor is the point that POVMs are in some way illegitimate. In par-
ticular, POVMs as probability bookkeeping devices are beyond reproach. Rather,
we have an intriguing puzzle here. We have a rich structure with a clear kinship to
quantum logic. It leads to consequences that apparently go beyond what standard
orthomodular lattice-based quantum logic can account for. But there are questions
about how best to understand the structure and the objects—effects and POVMs—
from which it is constructed. Furthermore, some of these questions clearly raise
logical issues: what are the criteria for settling when effect operators do and do
not represent equivocally? How could a set of effects that apparently can’t have
sharp values be isomorphic to a set of mutually commuting effects? How should
we understand attributions of unsharp values?
6 Concluding Thoughts
I’ll confess that I find the quantum logical reconstruction results—that is, the co-
ordinatization theorems—remarkable. Discovering that purely lattice-theoretic as-
sumptions can yield structures as rich as Hilbert space is a bit like one’s first expe-
rience of seeing a rabbit pulled out of a hat. To be sure, the quantum logical recon-
structions don’t have the simplicity and elegance of Hardy’s five-axiom reconstruc-
tion [25]. This is not really surprising. The quantum logical reconstruction aims to
derive Hilbert space from a more basic level of structure than Hardy begins with;
the assumptions used in the quantum logical reconstruction don’t even mention
probability. In spite of this, it’s fair to say that a purely lattice-theoretic approach
to quantum foundations is a program that has mostly run its course. However, this
is entirely compatible with saying that we can learn a good deal about quantum
systems by studying broadly logical and combinatoric features of quantum sys-
tems. That program has by no means run out of steam. Pitowsky’s work certainly
fit that description. So does the work of Maria Dalla Chiara and her students. See
[26], [22]. So does the work by Busch, Cabello and Caves et al noted above. So
does the program of Cabello and his associates on the “exclusion principle” and re-
lated matters. See [27] and [28] in addition to the work already cited. Jeffrey Bub
argues that the idea of “quantum information” is closely tied to the non-Boolean
event structure of quantum mechanics. See, for instance, [29]. There are many,
many other examples. Much of this work doesn’t draw on lattice theory. All of it,
in my view, is ver much in the spirit of quantum logic.
There is no royal road to understanding quantum theory and it would be fool-
ish to argue that broadly quantum logical approaches have some unique claim to
insight. However, when the talk on which this paper is based was originally pre-
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sented, the moderator suggested that I was about to discuss a “failed program.”
With all due respect to that worthy gentlemen, I’m afraid I would have to disagree.
It might be argued that the reconstruction theorems themselves didn’t lead directly
to physical insight, though that claim itself could be disputed. Those theorems did
show, however, that a great deal of the physically important structure of quantum
theory is implicit at what I have been calling the logical level. And there is an even
better case for claiming that the broader concerns behind the interest in quantum
logic have born real fruit. Whether or not quantum logic itself is dead, I expect its
successors to continue making contributions for some time to come.
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